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This paper analyzes the dynamic e®ects of anticipated monetary and ¯s-
cal policies in a large monetary union, which is characterized by asym-
metric interest rate transmission. We explicitly solve the asymmetric
three-country model using the decomposition methods of Aoki (1981)
and Fukuda (1993). Anticipated monetary and ¯scal expansions lead to
negative international spillovers and to intertemporal reversals in the re-
lative e®ectiveness of policy on member country outputs. Intertemporal
international coordination of monetary policies between Euroland and
the US is able to stabilize the output adjustment processes induced by
an anticipated unilateral ¯scal expansion.
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This paper analyzes the dynamic e®ects of anticipated monetary and ¯scal policies
in a large asymmetric monetary union. A three-country framework serves to illu-
strate the dynamic spillover e®ects of monetary and ¯scal policies and the potential
bene¯ts of international policy coordination. We investigate international transmis-
sion within the monetary union (called internal) and between the monetary union
and the rest of the world (external).
The motivation for our analysis is the establishment of the European Moneta-
ry Union (EMU or Euroland) in 1999. Viewed in a global context, the EMU can
already now, and even more after the upcoming EU-enlargement, no longer be in-
terpreted as a small country. In addition, there is considerable evidence that the
EMU member countries, and even the core countries Germany, France and Italy,
are characterized by asymmetric macroeconomic structures. It is debated, however,
to which extent these asymmetries in the macroeconomic structures actually trans-
late into perceptible and robust di®erences in the strength and the timing of ECB
policy transmission. In this context, it is fair to say that most attention focuses on
di®erences in the strength of interest rate transmission within the EMU.1
Against this background, our paper is the ¯rst to discuss the e®ects of monetary
and ¯scal policy in a dynamic context of a large and asymmetric monetary union.2
The two union member countries are assumed to a large extent to be completely
symmetric, except for the strength of the interest rate channel in aggregate demand.
Furthermore, we allow the non-member or third country to have preferences for ho-
me goods and import goods di®erent from those in the union member countries.
Our analysis applies the decomposition method by Aoki (1981) and its generaliza-
tion to the N-country case by Fukuda (1993). While Fukuda (1993) assumes in an
N-country setting complete symmetry of countries we restrict our attention to the
three-country case but are able to introduce several empirically relevant macroeco-
nomic asymmetries.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model, applies the
decomposition method to the asymmetric three-country context and derives the
solutions to the various respective sub-systems. Section 3 analyzes the dynamic
e®ects of anticipated monetary and ¯scal policies in the monetary union on the
member countries and the third country. Moreover, section 3 discusses the bene¯ts
of international monetary policy coordination with respect to the absorption of
anticipated ¯scal policies. Section 4 summarizes the main results.
1See e.g. Angeloni et al. (2001), Clausen (2001), De Grauwe (2000), Dornbusch et al. (1998) and
Cecchetti (1999).
2Dynamic models for a small asymmetric monetary union are provided in Wohltmann and Clausen
(2002(a), 2002(b), 2001) and Clausen and Wohltmann (2004).
12 A Large Asymmetric Monetary Union
2.1 Model equations
We consider three large open economies of identical size. Two economies (U1 and U2)
form a monetary union. The common monetary policy is assumed to be conducted
by the ECB. As in reality, the union has °exible exchange rates with respect to the
third country, the US. The two member countries are taken to be largely symmetric
except for selected asymmetries: As in Wohltmann and Clausen (2004), we consider
an asymmetry in the strength of the interest rate channel in aggregate demand.
Furthermore, both member countries are allowed here to have asymmetries in their
relations to the large third country on the demand as well as on the supply side.
This assumption is justi¯ed by the presence of intra-European asymmetries in the
respective degrees of openness toward the rest of the world (Clausen, 2001). As
these are not primarily linked to the monetary policy regime they are likely to
persist despite the establishment of a common monetary policy.
The demand side of the model is speci¯ed in the tradition of Mundell/Fleming-
models, i.e., consists of IS- and LM-equations and uncovered interest parity. The
supply side is represented by expectations-augmented Phillips-curves. The price
adjustment equations assume rational expectations and contain a long-run supply
function.
The notation is as follows: y = real output, i = short-term nominal interest rate,
i ¡ _ pc = real interest rate, pc = consumer price index, g = real government con-
sumption, p = price level of the domestically produced good, e = common external
nominal exchange rate, ¿ = external terms of trade, m = money supply. The varia-
bles of the member country U1 (U2) are indexed as "
1\ ("
2\). Variables of the third
country are denoted by a "
¤\. A dot on top of a variable denotes the right-hand side
derivative with respect to time t. A bar on top represents the long-run or steady
state level of the respective variable. All variables are expressed in logarithms, ex-
cept for the interest rates i1, i2 and i¤. All parameters are speci¯ed to be positive
and are interpreted as elasticities or semi-elasticities.
The complete model consists of the following equations:
2IS equations:
y1 = (a01 + a1y1 ¡ a21(i1 ¡ _ p
c
1)) + g1 + (b0 ¡ b1y1 + b2y2 ¡ b3(p1 ¡ p2)) (1)
+ (c0 ¡ c1y1 + c2y
¤ ¡ c3¿1)
y2 = (a02 + a1y2 ¡ a22(i2 ¡ _ p
c
2)) + g2 ¡ (b0 ¡ b1y1 + b2y2 ¡ b3(p1 ¡ p2)) (2)
+ (c0 ¡ c1y2 + c2y
¤ ¡ c3¿2)
y
¤ = (a0 + a1y
¤ ¡ a2(i
¤ ¡ _ p
¤c)) + g
¤ ¡ (c0 ¡ c1y1 + c2y
¤ ¡ c3¿1) (3)
¡ (c0 ¡ c1y2 + c2y
¤ ¡ c3¿2)
where
¿1 = p1 ¡ (p
¤ + e) ; ¿2 = p2 ¡ (p
¤ + e) (4)
p
c
1 = ®1p1 + ®2p2 + ®3(p
¤ + e) (5)
p
c
2 = ®1p2 + ®2p1 + ®3(p







2(p1 ¡ e) + ®
¤
3(p2 ¡ e) (7)
and making the following assumptions:




(a21 + a22) (9)








m = m1 + m2 = (p
c
1 + l0 + l1y1 ¡ l2i1) + (p
c
2 + l0 + l1y2 ¡ l2i2) (11)
m
¤ = p
¤c + l0 + l1y
¤ ¡ l2i
¤ (12)
where the interest rates i1, i2, i¤ are linked by uncovered interest parity:
i1 = i2 = i
¤ + _ e (13)
Price adjustment equations:
_ p1 = _ p
c
1 + ±(y1 ¡ y1) (14)
_ p2 = _ p
c
2 + ±(y2 ¡ y2) (15)
_ p




where the steady-state-outputs y1, y2, y¤ are determined by the following long-run
3supply functions:
y1 = f0 + f1¿1 + f2(p1 ¡ p2) (17)















The equations (1), (2) and (3) are standard IS-curves to model aggregate demand
in the three countries. Aggregate demand consists of real private absorption, real
government consumption and the aggregate trade balance. Real private absorption,
the ¯rst expression in brackets, depends on real output and on real interest rates.
The aggregate trade balance, the second and third expression in brackets, depends
on output developments and on relative prices. This holds within the monetary union
(with internal relative prices or terms of trade) as well as between the respective
union country and the rest of the world (with external relative prices or terms of
trade).3 We specify the IS-equations (1), (2) of the union member countries U1 and U2
to be structurally symmetric except for an asymmetry in the semi-interest elasticity
of private absorption. Real private absorption in U1 is assumed to react more strongly
to real interest rates than in U2 (a21 > a22).4 As regards to the trade balances of U1
and U2 it is assumed that international trade between the union member countries
is characterized by identical marginal import and export propensities (b1 = b2).
The propensity to import is taken to be higher within the monetary union than
with respect to the rest of the world (b1 > c1). In other words, households have a
stronger preference for imports from the respective partner country than from the
third country.
In order to solve our asymmetric three-country-model with the aid of the de-
composition methods by Aoki (1981) and Fukuda (1993), we need to assume in the
de¯nitions (5), (6) of the consumer price indices pc
1 and pc
2 that member country
households have the same preference for their home goods and for imports from
the other member country (®1 = ®2). This assumption requires a highly integrated
monetary union. It ensures that the member country price indices (pc
j) as well as
real interest rates (ij¡ _ pc
j; j = 1;2) are identical across the monetary union (Clausen
and Wohltmann (2004)). This allows us to decompose the overall system in three
3The internal bilateral trade balances exactly mirror each other if the bilateral trade balance is
initially in equilibrium and if purchasing power parity holds. The third expression in brackets in
(1) (or (2)) has the opposite sign of the second (or third) expression in brackets in (3).
4Given that both member countries are of identical size in the initial equilibrium, i.e., (y1)0 = (y2)0,
we need to assume that the constants a01 and a02 in (1) and (2) are not identical: a01 6= a02. It is
straightforward to compute the necessary numerical di®erence between the constants (see Clausen
and Wohltmann (2004)).
4sub-systems - one aggregate system and two di®erence systems - despite the assumed
asymmetry in the strength of interest rate transmission in (1) and (2).
The two member countries U1 and U2 are aggregated to an average member
country by considering the arithmetic mean of respective variables and equations
(1
2(U1+U2)) and compared in their behaviour with the non-member country (NMC).
The large third country NMC is assumed to have an IS-equation (3) being fully
symmetric with the average IS-equation of U1 and U2. This case prevails if the
interest sensitivity of private absorption in the NMC (a2) equals the arithmetic
mean of the semi-interest elasticities a21 and a22 in U1 and U2 (cf.(9)). Moreover,
NMC households have the same preference for imports from both union member
countries U1 and U2 (®¤
2 = ®¤
3).
The expressions (11) and (12) re°ect standard money market equilibrium condi-
tions in both, the monetary union and in the third country NMC.5 The monetary
union has a common money market in which the aggregate money stock m is as-
sumed exogenous while its distribution across the member countries is determined
endogenously by the respective national money demand functions. Interest rates af-
fect money demand and are linked internationally by uncovered interest parity (see
13)). We assume rational expectations.6 The price adjustment equations (14), (15),
(16) are expectations-augmented Phillips-curves with rational expectations concer-
ning consumer price in°ation. The rate of in°ation depends positively on the output
gap, i.e., on the di®erence between actual and long-run equilibrium output. Long-
run equilibrium or natural output is determined within a long-run supply function
by the internal and external equilibrium terms of trade.7 In the third country, natu-





Our asymmetric dynamic three country model can be solved using the decompo-
sition methods pioneered by Aoki (1981) and Fukuda (1993). The overall system
is transformed into three sub-systems - two di®erence systems and one aggregate
system. The ¯rst di®erence system (1
2(U1 + U2) ¡ NMC) describes the di®erential
developments between the average union member country and the third country.
5As in Turnovsky (1986) and Fukuda (1993), the real money stock is derived by de°ating the nomi-
nal money stock by the respective consumer price index, not by the price level of the domestically
produced good.
6In this deterministic context, rational expectations concerning the exchange rate is equivalent
to assuming perfect foresight. Denoting E as the expectations operator this means E(_ e) = _ e.
Analogous equations are assumed to hold for consumer price in°ation _ pc
1, _ pc
2 and _ p¤c in the IS- and
Phillips-curves.
7Microeconomic foundations of this speci¯cation are provided in Devereux and Purvis (1990) and
in Clausen and Wohltmann (2004).
5It is derived by subtracting from the arithmetic mean of the IS-, LM- and price
equations in the union the respective equations of the third country. The dynamics
of this di®erence system are described by a two-dimensional di®erential equation























(p1 + p2): (22)
¿a represents the arithmetic mean of the external terms of trade of both member
countries, ld the di®erence between the average real money stock within the moneta-
ry union and the real money stock in the third country. This system exhibits saddle
path stability. Its solution is completely independent from the other two sub-systems
(U1 ¡ U2, 1
2(U1 + U2) + NMC).
The second di®erence system (U1 ¡ U2) describes within the monetary union
the di®erential developments of both member countries U1 and U2. It is derived
by subtracting corresponding equations of the two member countries U1 and U2
from each other. The dynamics of this di®erence system U1 ¡ U2 are governed by a
(non-homogeneous) di®erential equation in the internal price di®erential p1¡p2. This
di®erential equation contains the rate of change of the average external terms of trade
_ ¿a as input, which is a component of the ¯rst di®erence system 1
2(U1+U2)¡NMC.
It implies that the second di®erence system cannot be solved independently from
the ¯rst di®erence system.8 However, as in the case of the ¯rst di®erence system, it
does not depend on the aggregate system 1
2(U1 + U2) + NMC.
The aggregate system 1
2(U1+U2)+NMC can be derived by adding the equations
for the average member country and the respective equations of the third country. Its








Like the di®erence system U1 ¡ U2, the aggregate system 1
2(U1 + U2) + NMC
cannot be solved independently from the ¯rst di®erence system 1
2(U1 +U2)¡NMC
because the di®erential equation in the aggregate variable ls contains the rate of
change of the average external terms of trade _ ¿a as a time-varying driving factor.
The solutions to the three sub-systems allow us to recover by suitable transfor-
mations the solution paths of all variables of interest in the original three-country
model. Output developments in the individual countries U1, U2 and NMC are sol-
8This unidirectional dependence between the two di®erence systems directly follows from the assu-
med asymmetry on the demand side in the two union countries. In the case of symmetry (a21 = a22),
the solution to the second di®erence system would be completely independent from the other two
sub-systems.
6ved only on the basis of the solution paths for the two di®erence systems. They are
completely independent from the aggregate system. In contrast, the determination
of the average real money stocks ma ¡pa and m¤ ¡p¤ and of nominal interest rates
i1, i2 and i¤ require the solution to the aggregate system.
The following subsections present the solution to the asymmetric three country
model on the basis of the above decomposition. We start with the two di®erence
systems 1
2(U1 + U2) ¡ NMC and U1 ¡ U2 and continue with the aggregate system
1
2(U1 + U2) + NMC. It is assumed that all countries start in t = 0 from an original
steady state, which is assumed to be identical for all three countries. Furthermore,
the impulse is assumed to be a policy announcement in t = 0 for an implementation
in T > 0. The private sector has rational expectations, regards the policy announ-
cement as credible and anticipates the policy e®ects already before implementation.
More concretely, we investigate the dynamic e®ects of an anticipated expansionary
monetary policy taking the form of an increase in the rate of growth of the uni-
on money stock (d _ m > 0) and of an anticipated symmetric ¯scal expansion in the
monetary union (dg1 = dg2 > 0).
2.3 The di®erence system
1
2(U1 + U2) ¡ NMC
The ¯rst di®erence system is based on the following equation system, which can be
derived from the complete model (1){(20):
¸1y
a ¡ ¸2y
¤ = a0 ¡
1
2






















a ¡ _ p
a) ¡ ( _ m
¤ ¡ _ p
¤)
¢
¡ l2( _ m


















a = f0 + f1¿
a (28)
y













(g1 + g2) (30)
¸1 = 1 ¡ a1 + 3c1 ; ¸2 = 1 ¡ a1 + 3c2 (31)












































The terms of trade ¿a are considered as a jump variable because they contain the
°exible and forward-looking nominal exchange rate e. In contrast, the di®erence in
the real money stocks ld is taken as a predetermined variable as long as the levels
of the nominal money stock ma and m¤ are constant and given that the di®erence
between the average price level developments in the union pa and the price level in
the third country p¤ remains continuous at every point in time t.9
Under the weak assumption
¸1®3 + 2¸2®
¤
3 ¡ 2a2±(®1 ¡ ®
¤
3) > 0 (35)
the characteristic root r1 is unambiguously negative.10 Then, due to r2 > 0, the
determinant of the system matrix (32) is always negative. It follows that the dynamic
system (32) is characterized by saddle-path stability. The non-explosive, convergent





























r1t for t > T (37)
where erjt := exp(rjt) and the characteristic vectors h1 and h2 and the constants
9The interpretation of ¿a as a jump variable and of ld as a predetermined variable follows Buiter
and Miller (1982) and Turnovsky (1986).
10See Buiter and Miller (1982) for an economic interpretation of the stability condition (35).


















































0 and d¿a := ¿a
1 ¡ ¿a
0 denote the steady state e®ects
of exogenous shocks on the state variables.11 In the case of monetary and ¯scal
policy taking the forms d( _ ma ¡ _ m¤) > 0 and d(ga ¡ g¤) > 0, it follows from the







¤) + 0 ¢ d( _ m
a ¡ _ m
¤) (41)
with
Á = f1(1 ¡ a1 + 3c1) + 2f
¤
1(1 ¡ a1 + 3c2) + 3c3 > 0 (42)
dl
d
= ¡k ¢ d¿
a ¡ l2d( _ m







¤) ¡ l2d( _ m
a ¡ _ m
¤)
with





Using (26) and (27), we ¯nd the following solution paths for the average union


































































2.4 Di®erence system U1 ¡ U2
The second di®erence system describes di®erential macro-economic developments
within the monetary union. De¯ning the internal di®erences in output and price
developments as:
y
d = y1 ¡ y2 ; p
d = p1 ¡ p2 (49)
the IS and price adjustment equations imply:
(1 ¡ a1 + 2b1 + c1)y
d = a01 ¡ a02 + 2b0 + g1 ¡ g2 (50)
¡ (a21 ¡ a22)(i1 ¡ _ p
c










d = (f1 + 2f2)p
d (52)
Due to a21 > a22, the di®erential output developments within the union depend on
the behaviour of the (common) real interest rate. The union real interest rate can
be expressed as the arithmetic mean of the aggregate (world) real interest rate
i
s
r = (i1 ¡ _ p
c
1) + (i
¤ ¡ _ p
¤c) (53)
and the di®erential in real interest rates
i
d
r = (i1 ¡ _ p
c
1) ¡ (i
¤ ¡ _ p















The aggregated real interest rate is
r follows from the aggregation of the IS equations















(1 ¡ a1 ¡ c1)y










Â = (1 ¡ a1 ¡ c1)
®3
±





10The system (50) to (56) can be reduced in conjunction with the state equation












































(a21 ¡ a22) > 0 (61)
The di®erential equation (58) cannot be solved independently from the ¯rst di®e-
rence system because the constant ¹ di®ers from zero due to a21 > a22.12 (58) then
contains the rate of change of the average terms of trade _ ¿a as a variable input. The
solution path for _ ¿a follows from (36), (37) by di®erentiation with respect to time t;




























r3t + e A1e
r1t
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c3 ¡ f1(1 ¡ a1 ¡ c1) + 2f
¤








The time path of the output di®erential yd is derived from (51) by di®erentiating the
solution path for pd with respect to time t and inserting the result in (51). Assuming
12In the following, the weights ®3 and ®¤
3 in (5), (6), (7) are assumed to satisfy ®¤
3 · ®3 · 2®¤
3.
The assumption ®3 · 2®¤
3 is according to (10) equivalent to ®1 + ®2 ¸ ®¤
1 and implies Â < 0 in
(57). The assumption ®3 ¸ ®¤
3 is - given (60) - su±cient with respect to ¹ > 0.
11identical initial values for y1 and y2 we arrive due to yd






































r3t + e A1r1e
r1t¢





d = (f1 + 2f2)dp
d (69)
If the solution path of the output di®erential shows within the anticipation period
0 < t < T a point of reversal t? (i.e., yd(t?) = 0), we ¯nd from (67) by setting the











If a point in time t? exists in the anticipation period (0;T) in which the output
levels are identical across the union, it will exclusively depend on the stable cha-
racteristic roots of the two di®erence systems. Therefore, t? will be the same for all
exogenous shocks and will not depend on the length of the anticipation period T
between the announcement in t = 0 and the implementation in t = T.
The solution paths for the average output level ya and for the output di®erential















2(U1 + U2) + NMC
The aggregate system only serves to determine the evolution of the real money stocks
ma ¡ pa, m¤ ¡ p¤ and of nominal interest rates i1, i2 and i¤. The aggregation of the
13An analogous expression holds for the external terms of trade ¿1 and ¿2 where ¿d = ¿1 ¡ ¿2 =
p1 ¡ p2 = pd. The determination of real interest rates i1 ¡ _ pc
1 and i¤ ¡ _ p¤c does not require the
solution paths for the internal output and price di®erentials yd and pd as they only depend on the
rate of change of the average external terms of trade _ ¿a.
12IS and LM relationships yields the following equation system14
(1 ¡ a1 ¡ c1)y









¤ + _ e) + a2(_ p
c







¤c) = 2l0 + l1(y
a + y
¤) ¡ l2(2i
¤ + _ e) (73)
In conjunction with (26), (27) we arrive at the following di®erential equation de-










which fully captures the dynamic behaviour of the aggregate systems 1






























(1 ¡ a1 ¡ c1)l2 + l1a2
¢
> 0 (76)
The real money stock ls
c is a jump variable as it contains the forward-looking
and °exible nominal exchange rate e. The corresponding unstable (positive) cha-
racteristic root is r2 = 1=l2. As in the case of the di®erential equation (58) of the
di®erence system U1 ¡ U2 we ¯nd in the di®erential equation (75) of the aggregate
system again the average terms of trade as a variable input. The dynamic behaviour
of the aggregate system can be expressed alternatively via the monetary aggregate


































As a result of r2 > 0, a non-explosive (convergent) solution to (78) requires ls to be
classi¯ed as a jump variable.15







. In contrast with the aggregate systems in
Fukuda (1993), p. 594, and in Turnovsky (1986), p. 141, our system (72), (73) does not represent
a closed economy as it depends on the external terms of trade.
15See Turnovsky (2000), p. 147 (Proposition 5.3). This assumption can be justi¯ed economically - in
particular in the special case ®3 = 2®¤
3 - because this implies via (26) and (27) that the aggregate
13On economic grounds, it is reasonable to assume that ls remains continuous at
the anticipation date and is only allowed to adjust discontinuously in the presence















































for t > T and arbitrary c 2 R:
The convergent solution is given by










































r + d _ m
¤ (85)
d_ e = d _ m
a ¡ d _ m
¤ (86)
The real money stocks ma ¡pa and m¤ ¡p¤ can be inferred from the arithmetic
mean of ls and ld (rsp. ¡ld). As ld remains continuous at every point in time,
ma ¡ pa and m¤ ¡ p¤ jump by an equal amount at the implementation date T. The
size of the change at T equals half of the change of the aggregate variable ls at T.
For ma ¡ pa and m¤ ¡ p¤, we yield the following solutions:16
output level ya +y¤ equals its long-run equilibrium level ya +y¤ at every point in time. As long as
even temporary deviations from the steady state-output are ruled out, the neoclassical paradigm
requires that adjustments have to be borne by the perfectly °exible price level pa + p¤. As the
nominal money stock ma + m¤ is given at a point in time this implies that ls is a jump variable.
16The behaviour of nominal interest rates i1(= i2) and i¤ is derived by means of the LM equations






(ma ¡ pa) ¡ (ma ¡ pa)
¢
¡ ®3(¿a ¡ ¿a) + l1(ya ¡ ya)
ª
14For 0 · t < T this implies:
m
a ¡ p
































For t > T:
m
a ¡ p

























(ma ¡ pa)1 = (ma ¡ pa)0 + d(ma ¡ pa) (91)









(m¤ ¡ p¤)1 = (m¤ ¡ p¤)0 + d(m¤ ¡ p¤) (92)









3 E®ects of anticipated monetary and ¯scal poli-
cies
In the following, we analyze the dynamic e®ects of monetary and ¯scal policies in
the union on the member countries U1 and U2 and on the third country NMC.
We consider an anticipated increase in the rate of monetary growth in the union
(d _ m > 0) and a coordinated symmetric ¯scal expansion (dg1 = dg2 > 0). All policies
are credibly announced at t = 0 to be implemented at a later date T > 0.
3.1 Monetary expansion in the union
An isolated increase in the rate of growth of the union money stock _ m while holding
for simplicity monetary growth in the third country constant (d _ m¤ = 0) leaves in
the long run all output and terms of trade variables as well as the real interest rates
unchanged. The °exible nominal exchange rate fully insulates the third country from










(m¤ ¡ p¤) ¡ (m¤ ¡ p¤)
¢
+ 2®¤
3(¿a ¡ ¿a) + l1(y¤ ¡ y¤)
ª
:
15proportional change in all nominal variables and due to (43), (84) a permanent





d _ m = d_ pa = d_ pc
1 = d_ e = di1 (93)




= ¡l2d _ m
a ; d(m¤ ¡ p¤) = 0 (94)
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic e®ects of an anticipated increase in _ m. Figure
1(a) shows the phase diagram for the ¯rst di®erence system 1
2(U1 ¡ U2) ¡ NMC.17
Q0 denotes the initial and Q1 the ¯nal equilibrium. The adjustment process of the
state vector (¿a;ld)0, which is given formally by (36) with (37) and A1 = e A1 > 0,
starts with a discontinuous jump from Q0 to B. It is followed by a movement along
a trajectory, which belongs to the unstable arm I0 of the saddle point Q0. From
the date of implementation T onwards, the system moves along the new convergent
saddle path S1 from C to Q1.18 After the immediate real depreciation (¿a(0+) <
¿a
0) the economy experiences over time a real appreciation (_ ¿a > 0). This implies
according to (54) that the common union-wide level of real interest rates lies below
those in the third country. In other words, the real interest di®erential between the
union and the rest of the world remains negative throughout the overall adjustment
process (id
r < 0).
This behaviour of the real interest di®erential over time is illustrated in Figure
1(c).19
Furthermore, (26) and (27) imply a positive output di®erential viewed from the
perspective of the monetary union (ya > y¤). This follows from the results that
the average output level in the monetary union ya remains continuously above the
steady state level ya and that the output level in the third country experiences a
negative spillover e®ect(y¤ < y¤; see Figure 1(b)).20 The temporary increase in ya is
17In the case of a small monetary union we ¯nd an analogous adjustment process in the ¿a¡(ma¡pa)
dimension. See Clausen and Wohltmann (2004). The negative slope of the stable arm S0 (or S1)
belonging to the saddle point Q0 (or Q1) in Figure 1(a) equals h11 from (38).
18In the special case T = 0, i.e., a sudden and therefore unanticipated increase in _ m, the state
vector moves instantaneously and vertically onto the saddle path S1 (Point B0).
19In contrast, under the weak condition h11 > ¡1 the di®erential in nominal interest rates i1¡i¤ is
positive throughout the adjustment process, i.e., for t < T and for t > T. The following relationship
holds:
(i1 ¡ i¤) ¡ (i1 ¡ i¤) = _ e ¡ _ e = ¡(_ ¿a + _ ld)
with




r1(1 + h11)er1t ¡ r2er2t¢
for 0 < t < T
e A1r1(1 + h11)er1t for t > T
20Due to the contraction of output in the NMC, world output y1 + y2 + y¤ = 2ya + y¤ = y1 + y2 +
y¤ + 2
±(®3 ¡ ®¤
3)_ ¿a moves for all t > 0 either above (for ®3 > ®¤
3) or below (®3 > ®¤
3) the steady




Figure 1: E®ects of an anticipated monetary expansion in the union
17caused by the real depreciation of the common currency, which improves the trade
balance with respect to the third country, and, secondly, by the fall in real interest
rates within the union, which normally occurs and boosts real private absorption.
In the case that real interest rates within the monetary union i1 ¡ _ pc
1 fall on impact
we ¯nd that output in country U1, which is characterized by the relatively higher
interest sensitivity of private absorption (a21 > a22), receives initially a stronger
boost than output in U2. Therefore, the output di®erential yd = y1 ¡ y2 is initially
positive (yd(0+) > 0; see Figure 1(d)).21
The size and direction of this asymmetric monetary transmission within the uni-
on changes over time. The cyclical asymmetries lead to dynamic adjustments of
relative prices within the monetary union and with respect to the third country.
These, in turn, start to dampen the initial asymmetries within the union over time
and lead in the further course of the adjustment process even to a reversal in the
direction of cyclical asymmetries (Figures 1(d), 1(f)). At the date of announcement,
we ¯nd on impact a higher in°ationary pressure in country U1 than in U2. This
positive in°ation di®erential (_ pd(0+) > 0) leads to an increase in the internal and
external terms of trade p1 ¡p2 and ¿1 and, over time, to a relatively stronger worse-
ning of the trade balance and reduction in output in U1 than in U2. For a su±ciently
large t, the output di®erential yd changes its sign. This point in time is de¯ned as t?













3) > 0 (vgl. (60)).
According to (53)-(56) this (weak) condition is equivalent to the statement that the real interest
rate i1 ¡ _ pc
1 immediately falls: In the case d _ ma > 0 it follows for all t > 0




















As long as as the expression in brackets is positive, for which ®3 ¸ ®¤
3 constitutes a su±cient
condition, we ¯nd














The solution for the real interest rate in the third country is



















Under the assumption that the expression in brackets is negative it follows that









i¤ ¡ _ p¤c¢
0 for all t > 0:
22In the case of an expansionary monetary policy d _ m > 0, we ¯nd due to A1 = e A1 and dpd = 0 the
same value for t? by setting in (68) yd for t > T equal to zero. The overall adjustment process in
the case of monetary policy is characterized by a single point of reversal in the output di®erential
yd.
18rence variable ya¡y¤ stays positive throughout the adjustment process, we ¯nd the
internal output di®erential yd for t > t? to be negative. This means that the output
y2, which is smaller than y1 up to the point of cyclical reversal t?, exceeds the value
of y1 for t > t?. In the new steady state, both outputs are equal again and return to
their initial values.
Figure 1(e) displays the evolution of the real money stocks ma¡pa and m¤¡p¤.23
In the anticipation period 0 < t < T we derive a continuous fall of ma ¡ pa, which
results from the increase in the average rate of in°ation in the union (_ pa > _ ma
0 for
0 < t < T). In contrast, the negative output-spillover with respect to the third
country causes there a fall in the rate of in°ation (_ p¤ < _ m¤
0). In consequence, the
global economy experiences during the anticipation period an in°ation di®erential
between the union and the third country. At the date of implementation T, both
real money stocks ma ¡ pa and m¤ ¡ p¤ fall by the same amount, which, taken
individually, equal half of the decline of the aggregate real money stock ls in T.24
The union continues to experience an overshooting of the average rate of in°ation
even after the implementation of the monetary expansion (_ pa > _ ma
1 for t > T). At
the end of the adjustment process average in°ation falls back to the the new rate of
monetary growth in the union ( _ pa
1 = _ ma
1). In contrast, in°ation in the third country
returns in the new steady state to the initial level ( _ p¤
1 = _ p¤
0 = _ m¤
0). The union faces
according to (93) a lasting increase in nominal interest rates i1 and i2. This incurs a
permanent fall in the real money stock ma ¡pa in order to maintain an equilibrium
in the money market. In contrast, the third country does not experience in the long
run a change in i¤ and m¤ ¡ p¤.
3.2 Fiscal Expansion in the Union
A simultaneous and identical increase in union government spending while keeping
¯scal policy in the third country unchanged (i.e., dg1 = dg2 > 0, dg¤ = 0) leads
according to (41), (47), (48) to a lasting increase in the average terms of trade and in
the average union output level. In the long run, the third country clearly experiences
a negative output-spillover e®ect (d¿a > 0, dya > 0, dy¤ < 0).25 A unilateral ¯scal
expansion in the union induces therefore a permanent cyclical di®erential in favor
of the union relative to the third country (d(ya ¡ y¤) > 0). The same holds within
23These adjustment paths are based on the solution formulas (87)-(90) in conjunction with the
realistic assumptions º > 0 and 1 + ºh11r1
1
r1¡r2 > 0.
24The jump of ls in T satis¯es:







< 0 (in the case º > 0):
25The change in world output in the steady state may be positive or negative: dy1 + dy2 + dy¤ =
2(f1 ¡ f¤
1)d¿a ? 0 for f1 ? f¤
1:
19the union where we ¯nd, despite the symmetric ¯scal impulse in both countries, a
permanent cyclical di®erential in favor of the member country with the relatively
lower interest sensitivity of private aggregate demand (U2):26
dy




(f1 + 2f2)e a2di
s
r < 0 (95)
The internal price di®erential between U1 and U2 experiences a lasting decline
(dpd < 0), which improves the internal trade balance to the bene¯t of U1. Furthermo-
re, we derive from (66) a permanent rise in the aggregate real interest rate (di
s
r > 0).
Both member countries experience an identical increase in real and nominal interest
rates, which equals due to di
d
r = 0 the change in the corresponding rates in the third
country:27
d(ij ¡ _ pc
j) = dij = di
¤ = d(i¤ ¡ _ p¤c) > 0 (j = 1;2) (96)
The member country U2 faces an increase in the internal and external terms of
trade (d(p2 ¡ p1) > 0, d¿2 = d¿a ¡ 1
2dpd > 0). This unambiguously leads according
to the long-run supply function (18) to a higher output level in the steady state
while country U1 may under some circumstances also experience a reduction in y1.28
The di®erent reactions of the output variables in the steady state ya and y¤
correspond with the ultimate changes in the real money stocks ma¡pa and m¤¡p¤.
The long-run di®erential in the real money stocks amounts to
dl
d






The conditions ®3 > l1f1 and ®¤
3 > l1f¤
1, which receive empirical support, are
su±cient for dl
d
< 0. Furthermore, the union experiences a lasting decline in the
average real money stock.29
The third country faces according (92) a relatively smaller decline in (m¤ ¡ p¤),
while as a theoretical possibility a steady state increase in the real money stock
26This follows from the impact of the large monetary union on world interest rates. In the case of
a small monetary union, we ¯nd dyd = 0 because world real interest rates remain exogenous and
ultimately determine the level of real interest rates within the union (Clausen and Wohltmann
(2004)).
27Assuming 2f¤
1 ¸ f1, we ¯nd from (66) the unambiguous result di
s
r > 0 given that dga > 0. From
(28), (29) it then follows that d(ya ¡ y¤) = (f1 ¡ 2f¤
1)d¿a < 0.
28According to the long-run supply function (17), dpd=dga < 0 and d¿1=dga < 0 are jointly su±cient
for dy1=dga < 0. The condition f1a2[(1¡a1+2b1+c1)(f1+2f2)+2b3+c3] < 2e a2(f1+2f2)[f1c1+
f¤
1(1¡a1)+2f¤
1c2+c3] is necessary and su±cient for a decline in y1. This condition will be ful¯lled
for a su±ciently large value of f¤
1 or of c2. In these cases, we also have d¿1=dga < 0.
29We assume here dl
s



















20cannot be ruled out.
Figure 2 describes the dynamic e®ects of an anticipated symmetric ¯scal expansi-
on in the union. The phase diagram in Figure 2(a) illustrates the adjustment process
as Q0 ! B ! C ! Q1. We assume here the case of a permanent decline in the
real money stock di®erential (dl
d
< 0).30 After the real appreciation on impact the
union experiences over time a real depreciation up to the date of implementation
T, which is accompanied by a continuous increase in ld. After T, the adjustment
process moves along the new convergent saddle path S1 referring to the new steady
state. For t > T, we ¯nd a real appreciation and a gradual decline in the di®erential
in real money stocks. In view of (54), the real interest di®erential id
r moves oppo-
site to the rate of change of the average external terms of trade _ ¿a (Figure 2(c)).
Up to the date of implementation T, the union experiences a positive real interest
di®erential relative to the third country (id
r > 0 for t < T); after T a negative one.
Real interest rates in the union i1 ¡ _ pc
1 exceed for t < T the third country level
i¤ ¡ _ p¤c; the opposite holds for t > T. The steady state in the world economy is
again characterized by real interest parity i1 ¡ _ pc
1 = i¤ ¡ _ p¤c.
Figure 2(b) describes the output developments ya and y¤. In the anticipation
period 0 < t < T, average union output remains below the original equilibrium level
(ya < ya
0). This is caused by the initial real appreciation of the common currency and
by the likely increase in real interest rates i1¡ _ pc
1.31 At the date of implementation T,
we ¯nd a jump increase in ya. Afterwards output converges according to (26) and (45)
from above to the new steady state level ya
1. Output in the third country experiences
in the anticipation period a positive spillover e®ect (y¤ > y¤
0 for 0 < t < T). At the
implementation date T, we ¯nd despite the increase in ya a discontinuous fall y¤,
which is caused by an increase in real interest rates i¤ ¡ _ p¤c. In the period after
implementation t > T and governed by (27) and (46), output y¤ approaches from
below its new and lower steady state level (y¤
1 < y¤
0). Regarding the global cyclical
di®erential between the union and the third country, which is technically represented
by ya ¡ y¤, we ¯nd it to be negative up to T. In contrast, for t > T and as a result
of the unilateral symmetric ¯scal expansion, the union experiences a permanent
increase in output relative to the rest of the world.32 moves in the case ®3 > ®¤
3
similarly to ya¡y¤, i.e., for t < T we ¯nd a contraction and for t > T a development
above the new steady state level. In the case ®3 < ®¤
3, the adjustment process mirrors
the previous evolution.
30Note that in the solution form (36), (37) belonging to the state vector (¿a;ld)0 we have e A1 > 0 >
A1. In the special case of an unanticipated symmetric ¯scal expansion (i.e., T = 0), the relevant
constant is e A1 = ¡dl
d
and the adjustment process is given by the time path Q0 ! B0 ! Q1.
31i1 ¡ _ pc
1 necessarily rises as long as the constant ¹ in (60) is positive. A su±cient condition for this
scenario is ®3 ¸ ®¤
3.






Figure 2: Anticipated symmetric ¯scal expansion in the union
22A permanent real output di®erential also happens within the monetary union.
Under the realistic assumption that real interest rates increase on impact, member
country U1 faces due to a21 > a22 a relatively stronger recession than U2 (yd(0+) <
0).33 Correspondingly, (51), (58) imply a negative in°ation di®erential (_ pd(0+) < 0)
such that U1 faces a fall in its internal and external terms of trade p1 ¡ p2 and
¿1. As a result, y1 and the internal output di®erential yd increase. In the course
of the adjustment process yd may change its sign and turn positive. In contrast
with the case of monetary policy, a reversal in the internal cyclical di®erential only
occurs as long as the period between the announcement and the implementation of
the symmetric ¯scal expansion is su±ciently long. In this case, the date of cyclical
reversal t? given by (70) satis¯es t? < T. This case is illustrated in the Figures 2(d)
and 2(f).34 At the date of implementation T, we usually ¯nd a fall of yd as - under
regular circumstances - the real interest rate i1 ¡ _ pc
1 increases. This dampens the
stimulating e®ects from the symmetric ¯scal impulse in T and leads to a weaker
expansion in y1 relative to y2. In the case t? < T, the internal output di®erential yd
necessarily runs through another sign reversal in the further course of the adjustment
process (tU ¸ T) as the new steady state level yd
1 is negative. For t > tU, we ¯nd
yd < 0, as in the beginning of the adjustment process 0 < t < t?. For a su±ciently
large t (i.e., for t > ~ t (¸ tU) in Figure 2(d)) yd approaches yd
1 from below.35 This
implies according to (51) that the in°ation di®erential _ pd, which remains positive
over t? < t < ~ t, turns negative toward the end of the adjustment process.
The negative in°ation di®erential reduces over time the internal terms of trade
pd, which implies an increase in yd and therefore a convergence toward the new
steady state value yd
1 from below. The behavior of the output di®erential implies
that output y1 in U1 remains above the level in U2 only over the period t? < t < tU.
Figure 2(f) summarizes the output developments y1 and y2 over time and shows that
the symmetric ¯scal impulse leads to asymmetric cyclical developments across the
monetary union.
The development of the real money stocks ma ¡ pa and m¤ ¡ p¤ is provided
in Figure 2(e).36 The anticipation period 0 < t < T is characterized by a gradual
decline in the average rate of in°ation in the union (_ pa < _ ma
0) and by a gradual
increase in in°ation in the third country (_ p¤ > _ m¤
0). This can be rationalized by the
recession in the union (ya < ya
0) and by the nevertheless positive output spillover to
the third country during this period (y¤ > y¤
0). Correspondingly, we ¯nd a continuous
increase in ma ¡ pa and a fall in m¤ ¡ p¤. At the date of implementation T, both
33This result also holds in the case of a small monetary union (Clausen and Wohltmann 2004).
34In the case T < t?, i.e., with a fairly brief anticipation period, we ¯nd in most circumstances that
yd does not experience a sign reversal because it falls discontinuously at T and yd
1 < 0.
35In the special case ~ t = tU = T we ¯nd yd < yd
1 for all t > T and y2 > (y2)1 > y1 for all t > T.
36We continue to assume in (87){(90) º > 0 and 1 + ºh11r1
1
r1¡r2 > 0.
23real money stocks fall by the same amount.37
For t > T we derive a continuous decline in ma ¡ pa, which results from the
increase in the rate of in°ation in the union (_ pa > _ ma
0). In the third country, m¤¡p¤
gradually increases for t > T because the fall in y¤ generates a reduction in the rate
of in°ation NMC (_ p¤ < _ m¤
0). The new steady state is characterized by a lasting
reduction in ma ¡ pa compared with the initial equilibrium value. In comparison,
the fall in m¤¡p¤ in the third country is quantitatively smaller as its output y¤ and
its related long-run money demand decline.
3.3 Intertemporal international coordination of monetary
policy
The previous section demonstrated that a unilateral symmetric ¯scal expansion
in the union of the form dg1 = dg2 > 0 causes asymmetric output developments
across the world economy for ya and y¤ (see Figure 2). Moreover, this coordinated
symmetric ¯scal expansion also causes cyclical asymmetries across the monetary
union. This raises the question whether some form of international coordination
of monetary policies might be able to dampen or even neutralize the asymmetric
dynamics in the world economy as well as within the union. More speci¯cally, we
analyze whether the asymmetric output dynamics arising from anticipated demand
shocks can be encountered by an appropriate design of monetary policies in the
union and in the third country such that the system is stabilized at the output
levels in the respective steady states.
The primary goal of monetary policy is assumed to be price stability. Price sta-
bility is operationalized in our current framework by the requirement that consumer
price in°ation rates _ pc
1(= _ pca
1 ) and _ p¤c are not allowed to exceed the initial equilibri-
um levels (_ pc
1)0 and (_ p¤c)0, which are determined in turn by the respective original
rates of monetary growth _ ma




1 · (_ pc
1)0 = _ m
a
0 ; _ p
¤c · (_ p¤c)0 = _ m
¤
0 (98)
The current announcement of future ¯scal policies does not only cause e®ects
from its ultimate implementation but also already in the anticipation period 0 <
t < T, as long as the announcement is considered as credible by the private sector.
A complete stabilization in both, the anticipation period 0 < t < T and in the
period after implementation t > T, requires a design of monetary policy, which is
37We assume dl
s
=dga < 0. Then, the jump of ls in T turns out to be unambiguously negative:








24able to neutralize the announcement and implementation e®ects of anticipated ¯scal
policies.
More formally, complete stabilization of the output variables ya and y¤ by use of
the monetary policy instruments _ ma and _ m¤ will only be achieved if the constants
A1, A2 and e A1 in the solution to the di®erence system 1
2(U1 + U2) ¡ NMC given
by (39), (40) are set equal to zero. In this case there are no dynamic adjustment
processes. The state variables ¿a and ld as well as the output variables ya and y¤





0) up to the implementation






1). In the long run, monetary policy can only a®ect the variable l
d
. The steady
state values of the real variables ¿a, ya and y¤ do not depend on _ ma and _ m¤. It
follows immediately that monetary policy cannot neutralize the steady state e®ects
of ¯scal policy on ¿a, ya and y¤.
The condition A1 = A2 = 0 is necessary and su±cient to fully o®set the announ-
cement e®ects of ¯scal policy. Due to A1 = ¡A2 it follows in the case dg1 = dg2 > 0
and dg¤ = 0 from (39), (41), (43):
d( _ m










a > 0 (99)
The constants h11, Á and k are de¯ned in (38), (42) and (44). We ¯nd k+1=h11 < 0
irrespective of the sign of k; in the case dga > 0 the right hand side of (99) follows
to be clearly positive.
The primary goal of price stability (98) is assumed to only allow for a contrac-
tionary or a passive monetary policy in the union and in the third country (i.e.,
d _ ma · 0, d _ m¤ · 0) in their e®orts to dampen the cyclical e®ects of ¯scal poli-
cy at home and abroad. With this side condition, there remains only one way to
counteract the announcement e®ects from anticipated ¯scal policy in the union. The
central bank of the third country has to announce in t = 0 that it will lower its rate












a < 0 (100)
If this reaction function of monetary policy in the third country is considered
by the private sector in all three countries U1, U2 and NMC as credible it will
lead to anticipation e®ects. It implies that both di®erence systems as well as the
aggregate system remain in their initial steady states up to the implementation
date T. In particular, all output variables and rates of in°ation remain constant
up to T. In the ¿a ¡ ld-phase diagram in Figure 3(a) the initial announcement and
¯nal implementation of the monetary policy rule (100) lead in conjunction with the
25(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Stabilization by intertemporal international coordination of monetary policy
symmetric ¯scal expansion in the union dg1 = dg2 > 0 and an unchanged monetary
policy in the union (d _ ma = 0) to the following adjustment: the state vector (¿a;ld)0
remains up to T in the original steady state Q0 and converges subsequently along
the stable saddle path, which belongs to the original equilibrium S0, to the long-
run equilibrium Q0
0.38 In comparison with the new steady state Q1 with a passive
monetary policy (d _ m¤ = d _ ma = 0), we ¯nd here a larger decline in the di®erence in
real money stocks l
d
. Moreover, the implementation of the contractionary monetary
policy (100) implies for t > T that the output °uctuations from ¯scal policy, i.e.,
the deviations of the output variables ya and y¤ from their new steady state values
ya
1 and y¤
1, are magni¯ed. The central bank faces an intertemporal tradeo® in its
stabilization policies. The monetary policy rule (100), which stabilizes the system
38In isolation, the symmetric ¯scal expansion leads in the ¿a ¡ld-phase diagram to the adjustment
process Q0BCQ1 (where we assume dl
d
=dga < 0, i.e., k > 0). The stabilizing monetary policy
(100) causes in isolation an adjustment process up to T, which represents a mirror image (Q0 e B e C)
and for t ¸ T from e C to e Q1 following e S1. The simultaneous consideration of ¯scal and monetary
policy immediately leads the system to the equilibrium Q0
0.
26during the anticipation period t < T, destabilizes output developments for t > T.39
However, a complete stabilization of output in all countries can still be achieved
despite the monetary policy rule (100) if the union central bank adopts unexpectedly,
and therefore unanticipated by the private sector, a contractionary stance (d _ ma < 0)
in T. The appropriate size of the unanticipated reduction in _ ma can be derived from




















a < d _ m
¤ann
(101)
These results can be illustrated in the ¿a ¡ ld-diagram where the unanticipated
fall of _ ma causes in isolation the adjustment process Q0Q2Q0




2) is identical with the fall of l
d
, which follows from
the reduction of _ m¤ and the joint ¯scal expansion in the union (distance Q2Q0
0).
As all three policy measures are carried out simultaneously at T, the state vector
(¿a;ld)0 jumps instantaneously and vertically into the new long run equilibrium Q2.
The di®erence system 1
2(U1+U2)¡NMC does not experience any further adjustment
processes, neither for t < T nor for t > T (Figure 3(b)).41
In consequence, an intertemporal international coordination of monetary policies
allows for a complete stabilization of the di®erence system 1
2(U1 + U2) ¡ NMC: In
the case of an anticipated unilateral ¯scal expansion in the union being announced
in t = 0 for implementation in T > 0, cyclical dynamics between the monetary
union and the third country can be completely avoided if (1) monetary policy in the
third country announces in t = 0 for T > 0 a reduction of its rate of growth of the
money stock _ m¤ and (2) the union central bank (ECB) adopts unexpectedly in T a
contractionary stance of monetary policy. The reduction of monetary growth in the
union needs to be larger than the reduction of _ m¤. Furthermore, the reduction of _ ma
has to be unanticipated.42 Both monetary policies lead to a permanent decline in
39The value of the constant e A1, which is de¯ned by (40) and positive in the case dga > 0, will rise
due to A1 = 0. From (45), (46) we then ¯nd for t > T that the positive di®erence ya ¡ya
1 increases
in comparison with the case of a passive monetary policy while the for t > T negative di®erence
y¤ ¡ y¤
1 is smaller.
40In the case of a sudden and therefore unanticipated policy it is necessary to set the date of
implementation T in (40) equal to zero. The stability condition for t > T, i.e., e A1 = 0, is then
equivalent to dl
d
= 0. The policy rule for _ ma then follows from (43) and (100).
41The implementation of the monetary policy rules (100), (101) simultaneously ensures the com-
plete stabilization of the aggregate system 1
2(U1 +U2)+NMC, i.e., prevents dynamic adjustment
processes in the real money stocks ma ¡ pa and m¤ ¡ p¤.
42In the case that the anticipated ¯scal expansion only occurs in the third country (dg¤ > 0,
dg1 = dg2 = 0), the expression dga in (99) has to be replaced by ¡dg¤. In this case, complete
stabilization of the di®erence system 1
2(U1 + U2) ¡ NMC can be achieved by switching the roles
of the two central banks ECB and NMC (i.e., a previously announced and therefore anticipated
reduction of _ ma and an unanticipated reduction in _ m¤ being larger than the decline of _ ma). This
result also holds in the case of an anticipated ¯scal contraction in the union (dga < 0, dg¤ = 0).
27consumer price in°ation and are therefore consistent with the primary goal of price
stability.43
The monetary policies (100), (101) completely stabilize the di®erence system
1
2(U1 + U2) ¡ NMC and, furthermore, dampen the output °uctuations within the
monetary union (Figure 3(d)). As a result of A1 = 0 = e A1 and in conjunction
with (62), (63) as well as (67), (68), we ¯nd for the solution paths pd and yd of the
di®erence system U1¡U2 that the di®erence variables pd and yd remain tied to their
initial equilibrium values pd
0 and yd
0 up to the implementation date T. For t > T,


















r3(t¡T) for t > T (103)
At T, yd falls discontinuously. Afterwards it converges monotonically from below
toward the new, lower steady state value yd
1 (Figure 3(c)). The di®erence variable
yd does not experience a sign reversal anymore (yd < 0 for all t > T). This corre-
sponds with monotonic adjustment paths of the output variables y1 and y2 after the
implementation date T:





r3(t¡T) for t > T (104)





r3(t¡T) for t > T (105)
After the jump at T, y2 converges from above to its new, higher level (y2)1 while
y1 converges from below. Figure 3(d) assumes an increase in y1, while the e®ect is
theoretically ambiguous. Due to dyd < 0, this increase must be smaller than the
corresponding increase in y2.
43Note that d_ pc
1 = d _ ma < d_ p¤c
1 = d _ m¤ < 0. The asymmetric reductions in the rates of monetary
growth dampen according to (93) and (96) to di®erent degrees the symmetric increase in nominal
interest rates i1 and i
¤
following from the ¯scal expansion. This results in a permanent di®erential
in nominal (but not in real) interest rates between the union and the third country:
di1 ¡ di
¤





di1 = d(i1 ¡ _ pc













r + d _ m¤
284 Summary
This paper analyzes the dynamic e®ects of anticipated monetary and ¯scal policies
in a large asymmetric monetary union. We develop a macroeconomic three-country
model with sluggish price adjustment in the tradition of the expectations augmented
Phillips curve. Expectations formation concerning in°ation and the exchange rate is
assumed rational. Two countries form a large monetary union, which is characterized
on the demand side by asymmetric interest rate transmission. The solution metho-
dology draws upon the decomposition method by Aoki (1981) and its generalization
in Fukuda (1993). The complete and somewhat complex model is disaggregated by
suitable transformations into three sub-systems - two di®erence systems and one
aggregate system. The ¯rst di®erence system has a saddle path equilibrium and
describes the di®erence between the average development in the union and the ma-
croeconomic developments in the third country. It can be solved independently from
the other two sub-systems and generates the solution paths for the average external
terms of trade, the average output level in the union and for output in the third
country. The second di®erence system models the di®erential macroeconomic deve-
lopments within the monetary union. It is again independent from the aggregate
system. However, as it contains the rate of change of the average terms of trade as
a variable input, it is not independent from the ¯rst di®erence system. The second
di®erence system determines the solution paths for the internal price and output
di®erential. Output developments in both member countries are recovered by means
of the solution paths for the output variables in both di®erence systems. The aggre-
gate system is derived by the aggregation of the average developments in the union
and the corresponding developments in the third country. Its solution is indepen-
dent from the second di®erence system. However, it also contains the rate of change
of the average external terms of trade as an input variable. The aggregate system
generates the solution paths for the real money stocks and for nominal interest rates
in all three countries.
An anticipated increase in monetary growth in the union leads to a real depre-
ciation of the common currency, a decline in real interest rates and a temporary
expansion of average output in the union. The international spillover e®ect is nega-
tive - the third country experiences a temporary contraction in output. Furthermore,
we ¯nd asymmetric output developments within the monetary union, which result
from real interest rate changes and di®erent interest sensitivities of real private ab-
sorption. The boost in member country outputs turns out to be relatively stronger
in country 1 where the interest sensitivity of aggregate demand is by assumption
relatively higher. In the course of the adjustment process, di®erential cyclical deve-
lopments within the union cause di®erential relative price developments, which lead
over time to a reversal in the relative e®ectiveness of monetary policy on member
29country outputs. It can be shown analytically that there exists only one point of
reversal in the relative e®ectiveness of monetary policy on member country outputs,
i.e., where the common monetary policy starts to be more e®ective in the country
with the relatively smaller interest sensitivity of aggregate demand. This point of re-
versal only depends on the stable eigenvalues of the system. In the long run, output
and relative prices in all three countries return to their initial equilibrium values.
The monetary union merely experiences corresponding adjustments in the in°ation
rates and a lasting fall in the real money stock, while all real and nominal variables
in the third country remain unchanged.
An anticipated symmetric ¯scal expansion in the union leads during the anti-
cipation period to a real appreciation and an increase in real interest rates, which
trigger a temporary contraction of average output in the union. Output in the third
country rises initially. After the implementation of ¯scal policy, average union out-
put rises permanently beyond its initial equilibrium level while output in the third
country experiences a lasting contraction. We also ¯nd asymmetric output develop-
ments within the monetary union. In the short as well as in the long run, output
in the member country with the lower interest sensitivity of aggregate demand is
higher than in country 1. As long as the time span between the anticipation and
the implementation of the symmetric ¯scal expansion is su±ciently long, di®erential
in°ation developments worsen the internal and external terms of trade of the mem-
ber country with the relatively higher interest sensitivity of aggregate demand such
that by improvement of its international competitiveness its output is temporarily
higher than in the other member country.
An intertemporal international coordination of monetary policy, which is requi-
red to be consistent with the primary goal of price stability, allows to prevent output
°uctuations and di®erential macroeconomic developments resulting from the antici-
pated symmetric ¯scal expansion. The average output level in the union and in the
third country can be continuously kept with the following policy mix at their respec-
tive steady state levels: the central bank of the third country credibly announces in
t = 0 for T > 0 a reduction of its rate of monetary growth and implements this
policy jointly with the ¯scal expansion in the union. Moreover, the union central
bank simultaneously conducts in T > 0 an unanticipated contraction of its rate of
monetary growth, which goes beyond the respective reduction in the third country.
This policy mix removes all anticipation e®ects and keeps therefore up to the im-
plementation date the output levels in all three countries at their initial equilibrium
levels. At the date of implementation of all ¯scal and monetary policy measures,
average output in the union and in the third country immediately jump to their
new steady state values. Within the union, both member country outputs move in
a monotonic fashion to their respective new steady state levels.
In conclusion, our paper extends the previous literature in various dimensions:
30First, we apply the decomposition methodology pioneered by Aoki (1981) and ap-
plied to the symmetric N-country monetary union by Fukuda (1993) to the case
of an asymmetric monetary union with di®erent interest rate transmission. Second,
while most previous work considers a small monetary union we explicitly solve the
model of a large monetary union. We investigate both, the macroeconomic dyna-
mics from anticipated ¯scal shocks as well as the macroeconomic control options
and reaction functions of monetary policy. We show that a problem of national po-
licy coordination - how national monetary policy ought to respond to anticipated
national ¯scal policy shocks - can be partly solved by an intertemporal international
policy coordination. Policy coordination has to be international because it can be
shown on the basis of explicit solution of our model that national monetary policy
alone is unable to absorb the anticipated ¯scal shock. Policy coordination has to be
intertemporal as it needs to refer to actions at the announcement date t and the im-
plementation date T in order to counteract the e®ects from both, the announcement
and from the implementation of ¯scal policy. Interestingly, the implications for the
optimal monetary policies at home and abroad are very di®erent and also depend on
the direction of the ¯scal impulse: given an anticipated ¯scal expansion at home,
national monetary policy has to follow an unanticipated expansion in T while the
foreign country needs to conduct a speci¯cally designed anticipated monetary policy
with an announcement at t = 0 for an implementation in T > 0. Given an anticipa-
ted ¯scal contraction in the home country, national monetary policy has to make
an announcement at t = 0 for a contraction in T > 0 while foreign monetary policy
is required to follow an unanticipated contraction in T.
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